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WETLANDS REGULATORY MORASS: THE MISSING
TULLOCH RULE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Wetlands regulation under the Clean Water Act (CWA) is a
highly controversial means of environmental protection.' The controversy stems from two divergent concerns: those of environmentalists who seek to preserve the wetlands' unique ecosystems, and
those of property owners who seek to obtain the full agricultural
and economic value of their land. 2 The categorization and regulation of wetlands is crucial to both of these parties, namely for regu3
latory and legal purposes.
Prior to the 1970s, people perceived wetlands, such as bogs,
swamps and marshes, as breeding areas for disease. 4 Many of the
nation's wetlands were drained, filled and converted into dry land
as a result of this perception. 5 Over time, increased scientific
knowledge revealed that wetlands provide a habitat for wildlife, waterfowl and fish, as well as flood and water quality protection for
humans. 6 Improved scientific knowledge increased awareness of
7
the need to protect the nation's wetlands.
The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) claim regulatory jurisdiction of "waters of
1. See Corey Elizabeth Burnham, The Tulloch Rule: Its Rise, Demise and Resurrection. Will the New Version of the Rule Withstand Judicial Scrutiny?, 33 CONN. L. REV.
1349-53 (2001) (explaining controversy surrounding wetlands regulation).
2. See id. (explaining conflicting economic interests in wetlands regulation be-

tween property owners and environmentalists).
3. See id. (listing private property owners, trade associations, government regulators, environmentalists and scientists as interested parties).

4. See Daryn McBeth, Wetlands Conservationand FederalRegulation: Analysis of the

Food Security Act's "Swampbuster" Provisions as Amended by the FederalAgriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, 21 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 201, 215 (1997) (stating
that public has perceived wetlands as valueless areas to be filled or drained for
other uses); Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging changing public perception of wetlands).
5. See U.S.E.P.A., WETLANDS, Status and Trends, at http://www.epa.gov/
OWOW/wetlands/vital/status.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Status
and Trends Website] (discussing loss and degradation of wetland acreage throughout United States).
6. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1353-54 (stating that wetland law and policy
have arisen from government agencies' scientific study).
7. See id. (stating that scientific studies have assessed wetland value and
function).

(67)
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the United States," which include wetlands. 8 Wetlands regulation
falls primarily under Section 404 of CWA because wetlands development consists mainly of dredging and filling. 9 In order to be subject to Section 404, wetlands development must fall under Section
301 of CWA and "discharge a dredged material into a navigable
water from a point source."1 0 The phrase "discharge of a dredged
material" has created much debate between the regulated and the
regulating communities and the courts." The phrase carries signif12
icant regulatory implications for the agricultural community.
Prior to 1992, "discharge of dredged material" excluded de
minimis - small volume - movement of soil during dredging opera-

tions. 13 Thus, these activities did not require a Section 404 permit. 1 4 Many developers took advantage of this "loophole" in the

404 permit process. 15 Consequently, in North Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Tulloch,1 6 the court pronounced the "Tulloch Rule," which
8. See Definition of Waters of the United States, Definitions, 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a) (3) (2002) [hereinafter Definitions] (listing wetlands as "water of the
United States"); see also N.R.D.C. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975)
(stating that Corps adopted broad CWA definition of "waters of the United
States").
9. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (stating that EPA authorizes Secretary of Army
Corps of Engineers to regulate Section 404 dredge and fill permit program). The
Food Security Act's "Swampbuster" provision also addresses wetlands regulation.
See 16 U.S.C. § 3837 (2000). This comment focuses primarily on Section 404 of
CWA.
10. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000) (stating prohibition of discharge from point
source unless discharge falls under listed exception); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000)
(defining "discharge of a pollutant"); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (prohibiting discharge of dredged or fill material without permit).
11. See Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d
810, 815 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing whether farming technique creates "addition
of pollutant"); Rybachek v. U.S.E.P.A, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing whether returning sifted soil to stream bed constitutes "addition of pollutant");
United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing whether deposit of dredged or excavated material from wetland into same wetland qualifies as
"addition of pollutant"). But see Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating incidental fallback is not
"addition of pollutant").
12. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000) (requiring permits for those involved in
"discharging pollutants"). Section 404 provides a narrow exception for farmers
practicing normal practices that do not cause adverse environmental effects. 33
U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1) (A) (2000).
13. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1351 (stating pre-Tulloch Rule definition of
"discharge of dredged material").
14. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000) (requiring permits for discharge of
dredged or fill materials).
15. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1351 (stating that Tulloch exemplified egregious conduct within loophole).
16. Civil No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C. 1992) (stating complaint against
Tulloch which eventually led to suit's settlement).
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revised the definition of "discharge of dredged material" to include
small volume redeposit of dredged material within the waters of the
United States.1 7 Five years later, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) set aside the Tulloch Rule
and prohibited enforcement of the Rule through a nationwide injunction in NationalMining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.1 8 In response, the Corps modified its definition of "discharge
of dredged material" and promulgated a new rule to regulate redeposit of material, other than incidental fallback, into United States
waters. 19
Despite the Tulloch Rule's establishment and revision since
1992 and discussion in National Mining, the Rule is curiously absent
from the Ninth Circuit's and Supreme Court's analyses of Borden
Ranch Partnership v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, a recent
case dealing with redeposit of dredged material.2 0 The Supreme
Court's reticent affirmation of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bor21
den Ranch questions the validity of the new Tulloch Rule.
This Comment explores the current state of the Tulloch Rule
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Borden Ranch. Section II
provides a brief overview of wetlands and their controversial regulation. 22 Section III surveys the legislative history and statutory authority over wetlands. 23 Section IV traces the evolution of the
Tulloch Rule. 24 Finally, Section V evaluates Borden Ranch under a

17. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1351 (stating part of suit's settlement included EPA's promulgation of Tulloch Rule).
18. 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating Nat'l Mining's holding).
19. See Permits for Discharges of Dredged and Fill Materials into Waters of the
United States, Definitions, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) (1) (2002) [hereinafter Dredged
Materials] (defining "discharge of dredged material"); Further Revisions to the
Clean Water Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of Dredged Material," 66 Fed.
Reg. 4550, 4551 (Jan. 17, 2001) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323 (2002)) (incorporating Nat'l Mining decision into Final Rule).
20. See Nat'l Mining, 261 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing "discharge
of pollutant" under circuit split over definition of "discharge of pollutant"); see also
Borden Ranch, 537 U.S. 99, 100 (2002) (affirming Ninth Circuit's decision 4-4).
21. See Borden Ranch, 537 U.S. at 100 (2002) (providing no analysis on wetlands issue).
22. For a discussion on wetlands regulation, see infra notes 27-45 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of wetlands statutory history, see infra notes 46-75 and
accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the Tulloch Rule, see infra notes 76-132 and accompanying text.
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Tulloch Rule analysis.2 5 Section VI concludes with an analysis of
26
the Tulloch Rule's effectiveness as a regulatory guideline.
II.

A.

THE WETLANDS CONTROVERSY

Definition

Federal wetlands regulation breeds conflict between private
landowners and the government because the Corps, along with
other agencies, controls and regulates the activities of private wetland-owners.2 7 A wetland is subject to the CWA and EPA regula28
tions and to the EPA's and the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction.
The Corps defines wetlands as "those areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." 29 Wetlands generally include swamps, bogs
and marshland. 30 Wetlands also include "adjacent wetlands," which
are separated from other waters of the United States by man-made
dikes, natural river berms, beach dunes or other barriers. 31
B. Wetland Function
Wetlands preserve the environment for habitats to flourish and
for ecosystems to thrive. 32 A wetlands ecosystem is as biologically
25. For discussion of analysis, see infra notes 133-82 and accompanying text.
26. For discussion of conclusion, see infra notes 183-98 and accompanying
text.
27. See Burnham, supranote 1, at 1349 (explaining wetlands controversy relating to Section 404); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (authorizing Corps to have
jurisdiction over United States waters, including wetlands). See Definition of Waters of the United States, Purpose, 33 C.F.R. § 328.1 (2002) (stating Corps jurisdiction over wetlands). Agencies regulating wetlands are the Corps, United States
Department of Agriculture/Natural Resources Conservation Service (USDA/
NCRS), and the E.P.A. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (authorizing EPA and Corps'
wetlands jurisdiction); National Food Security Act (Swampbuster Act), 16 U.S.C.
§ 3801-42 (conferring wetlands-agriculture jurisdiction to U.S. Department of Agriculture and Natural Resource Conservation Service).
28. Definitions, supra note 8, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (a) (2) (2002) (including wetlands in definition of water of United States).
29. Id. (stating regulatory definition of wetlands).
30. Id. (enumerating examples of wetlands).
31. Definitions, supra note 8, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (c) (2002) (defining adjacent
wetland); see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 122
(1985) (holding adjacent wetlands are "waters of the United States").
32. McBeth, supra note 4, at 204-07 (discussing environmental and economic
benefits of wetlands).
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diverse and productive as a rainforest or coral reef.3 3 The shallow
water and vegetation provide primary habitats for many fish and
wildlife throughout the food chain. 34 Wetlands also control floods
by intercepting storm runoff and storing storm waters. 35 They also
improve soil and water quality by filtering mineral impurities. 3 6
Wetlands habitat also has commercial value. 3 7 Wetlands support ecotourism activities, such as hunting, fishing, bird watching
and photography, as well as the commercial and recreational fishing industries. 38 Additionally, wetlands have an aesthetic value,
providing tourists an opportunity to watch, feed and photograph
wildlife.

C.

39

Wetlands Condition

It is estimated that over 220 million acres of wetlands existed
prior to European settlement of the contiguous United States. 40
During this time, people viewed wetlands as "mosquito havens" requiring draining and filling. 41 Until the 1980s, developers systematically destroyed, drained and converted wetlands into dry land. 42

As a result, between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s, the United
States lost over 58,000 acres of wetlands annually due to the transformation and conversion of wetlands into malls, farmlands, hous33. U.S.E.P.A., Function and Value, at http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/wedands/
vital/what.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Function and Value Website]
(stating wetland function).
34. Id. (explaining wetland function).
35. Id. (explaining how wetlands function as sponges and temper erosive potential of floodwater).
36. Id. Wetlands slow water flow, allowing sediment from fertilizer, manure,
and sewage to drop to the wetland floor before it leaves a wetland. Id.
37. McBeth, supra note 4, at 205 (stating that ninety-five percent of commercially harvested fish and shellfish are wetland dependent).
38. Function and Value Website, supra note 33 (stating that wetlands ecotourism added fifty-nine billion dollars, and commercial, fishing and recreational industry added seventy-nine billion dollars, to United States economy in 1991).
39. McBeth, supra note 4, at 207 (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Agric. Stabilization and Conservation Serv., 901 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1990) as exemplifying legal
recognition of aesthetic wetland value).
40. Status and Trends Website, supra note 5 (delineating history of United
States wetlands).
41. McBeth, supra note 4, at 215 (citing Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 18
F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (stating that "yesterday's Everglades swamp to be
drained as a mosquito haven is today's wetland to be preserved for wildlife and
acquifer recharge").
42. Status and Trends Website, supra note 5 (stating that 1950s-70s was era of
major wetlands loss).
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ing developments and roads. 43 Wetlands degradation and
destruction increased flood and drought damage and decreased
bird populations. 44 In the past thirty years, increased wetlands reg45
ulation and its enforcement steadily reduced wetlands loss.

III.

WETLANDS LAw

No specific federal wetlands protection law exists. 46 Section

404 of the CWA governs federal wetlands protection. 47 Section 404
delegates to the Corps the authority to "issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters at specified
disposal sites."48 Section 301 (a) of the CWA prohibits the discharge
49
of any pollutant without a permit.

The CWA definition of "pollutant" includes "rock, sand, cellar
dirt, and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged
into water."50 Section 502 of the CWA defines "discharge of a pollutant" as any "addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source." 5 1 Furthermore, the statute defines "navigable waters" as United States waters and territorial seas; this definition inover navigable
cludes wetlands. 52 The Corps has jurisdiction
53
waters, their tributaries and adjacent wetlands.
43. See id. (describing amount of wetlands destruction); Burnham, supra note
1, at 1354 (chronicling wetlands destruction).
44. Status and Trends Website, supra note 5 (stating that degradation of wetlands function has diminished resources).
45. See Ken Burton and Diana Hawkins, Wetlands Loss Slows, Fish And Wildlife
Service Study Shows (Sept. 12, 1997), available at http://southeast.fws.gov/news/
1997/r97-84.html (stating wetlands loss was sixty percent less in 1997 than wetlands loss in 1970s-80s).
46. Burnham, supra note 1, at 1358 (stating that no specific CWA provision is
designated for wetlands protection). See also McBeth, supranote 4, at 212 (describing state initiatives to protect wetlands). Federal wetlands programs that protect
wetlands include the Food Security Act Swampbuster provisions, Wetlands Reserve
Program (WRP), Water Bank Program, Farmers Home Administration (FmHA),
and North American Wetlands Conservation Act of 1989. Id. at 209-12.
47. See id. at 217 (stating that Swampbuster provisions of National Food Security Act and CWA have overshadowed early Congressional attempts for wetlands
regulation).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (describing permit process for dredged and fill
materials).
49. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000) (prohibiting discharge of pollutant except as
in compliance with Sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342 and 1344).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000) (defining "pollutant").
51. Id. at § 1362(12) (A) (defining "discharge of a pollutant").
52. Id. at § 1362(7) (defining "navigable waters"); see also Definitions, supra
note 8, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2002) (defining navigable waters of United States to
include wetlands).
53. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (excluding seasonal intrastate waters from navigable
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Whether or not an activity falls within the jurisdictional definition of a Section 404 discharge is important for regulatory purposes, including the issuance of permits. 54 If an activity satisfies the
jurisdictional definition, anyone conducting the activity must apply
for a Section 404 permit. 55 The Corps issues permits according to
EPA guidelines (404(b) (1) Guidelines) for specifying each disposal
site.5 6 The EPA Administrator may deny or restrict use of a defined
area as a disposal site if it determines that discharge of materials
into the area will have an adverse effect on the environment. 57 Additionally, the Corps' Regulations provide guidelines regarding the
58
review, denial, modification, suspension or revocation of permits.
The application process for a Section 404 permit must comply
both with the Corps' "public interest review" and with EPA's
404(b) (1) Guidelines. 59 The public interest review balances the
benefits and detriments of the permit applicant's activity under a
three-prong test. 60 The test considers: (1) the public need for the

permit applicant's activity; (2) the practicability of using reasonable
alternative locations and methods to accomplish activity; and (3)
the extent of the activity's benefits and detriments. 61 The EPA
404(b) (1) Guidelines prohibit discharge if a practicable alternative
with a less adverse impact on the ecosystem exists, taking into consideration cost, technology and

logistics.

62

waters definition); see also United States v. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121, 129
(1985) (stating that United States' waters include adjacent wetlands).
54. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2001) (requiring permits for discharge of dredged

or fill material).
55. See id. (stating that discharge of dredged and fill material requires Section
404 permits).
56. See id. at § 1344(b) (stating that Secretary of Army shall issue permits according to guidelines created by EPA Administrator).
57. See id. at § 1344(c) (enumerating Administrator's power over Section 404

permits).
58. See Processing of Department of Army Permits, Authority to Issue or Deny
Permits, 33 C.F.R. § 325.8 (2002) (authorizing Corps to issue or deny permits);
Processing of Department of Army Permits, Modification, Suspension or Revocation of Permits, 33 C.F.R. § 325.7 (2002) (authorizing Corps to modify, suspend or
revoke permits).
59. General Regulatory Policies, General Policies for Evaluating Permit Applications, 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (2002) (delineating guidelines evaluating CWA § 404
permit applications).

60. Id. at § 320.4(a) (stating that public interest review is balancing test with
three prongs).
61. Id. at § 320.4(a)(2)

(2002) (enumerating three-prong public interest

review).
62. Compliance with the Guidelines, Restrictions on Discharge, 40 C.F.R.
§ 230.10 (2002) (enumerating guidelines for specification of disposal sites for
dredged or fill material).
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In addition, the Bush Administration has renewed the "no net
loss" policy, which requires permit applicants to submit a wetlands
mitigation plan with the permit. 63 Additionally, the Corps requires
64
replacing the wetlands' functional loss.
Section 404 contains a regulatory ambiguity, which some environmentalists refer to as a "loophole."65 The ambiguity is central to
the Tulloch Rule. 66 Section 301 of the CWA requires a Section 404
67
permit for activities that "discharge dredged or fill materials."
The ambiguity exists in the Corps' definition of "discharge of
dredged material." 68 Under the Corps' definition, "discharge of
dredged material" means the "addition of dredged material into
waters of the United States." 69 Consequently, the regulations re70
quire a Section 404 permit if there is an "addition" of a pollutant.
The regulations recognize the redeposit of dredged material as
an "addition," but they exclude "incidental fallback. '' 71 Thus, activities resulting in a small volume, or incidental, discharge are exempt
from a Section 404 regulation. 72 Environmentalists view this exclusion as a regulatory loophole because even small volume discharges
can have potentially adverse environmental effects. 7 3 Strict constructionists and developers continue to drain or insert pilings into
63. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 02-2, Guidance on Compensatory Mitigation Projects for Aquatic Resource Impacts under
the Corps Regulatory Program Pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and
Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (Dec. 24, 2002) [hereinafter
Regulatory Guidance Letter], availableat http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/functions/
cw/cecwo/reg/RGL2-02.pdf; see also Nat'l. Envt'l. Prot. Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1988) (including mitigation plan absent from CWA).
64. Regulatory Guidance Letter, supra note 63, at 2 (stating that Corps' regulations require appropriate and practicable mitigation to replace aquatic wetlands
resource).
65. Burnham, supra note 1, at 1360 (explaining regulatory gap existing in
regulation).
66. Id. (stating that loophole is pivotal to Tulloch Rule).
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000) (prohibiting discharge of pollutant from point
source without permit).
68. Dredged Materials, Definitions, supra note 19, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)
(2000) (defining "discharge of dredged material" with undefined terms such as
"addition" and "redeposit").
69. Id. (defining "discharge of dredged material").
70. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1360-61 (discussing "addition" requirement
to permitted discharge).
71. Dredged Materials, supra note 19, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (2002) (including "addition, including redeposit other than incidental fallback, of dredged
material" under regulation).
72. Id. at § 323.2(d) (2002) (exempting incidental fallback from regulation).
73. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1361 (stating possibility of wetlands destruction without "addition" of pollutant by release of small volumes of sequestered
pollutants resulting in significant environmental effects).
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wetlands because they believe that doing so conforms to Section
404 of the CWA's intent.7 4 Confusion regarding Section 404 de75
stroys an estimated 300,000 acres of wetlands annually.
IV.

A.

THE TULLOCH RULE

Origins of the Tulloch Rule

In 1986, the Corps defined "discharge of dredged material"
under Section 404 as "any addition of dredged material into the
waters of the United States," and expressly excluded "'de minimis,'
incidental soil movement occurring during normal dredging operations."76 Tulloch demonstrated that developers took advantage of
this definition because it left room for them to exploit the environment. 77 Tulloch involved a 1,800-acre project to build a residential
78
development and golf course in Hanover County, North Carolina.
Although the Corps determined that approximately thirty-nine percent of the site was wetlands, the developer completed the project
79
without obtaining a Section 404 permit.
The developer circumvented Section 404 permit requirements
by tailoring the development to fall under the de minimis exception of the 1986 regulation.8 0 Specifically, the developer excavated
the land matter so only drippings from the dredging buckets fell
back into the wetlands.8 1 This allowed the developer to eliminate
74. Id. at 1361-62 (explaining developer's exploitation of loophole).
75. Id. at 1362 (enumerating wetlands destruction); see also Further Revisions
to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of Dredged Material,"
65 Fed. Reg. 50,107, 50,109 (Aug. 16, 2000) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.3) (explaining wetlands-created loss by excluding incidental fallback from "discharge of
dredged material" regulation).
76. See Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d
1399, 1401 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing "Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the
Corps of Engineers," 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,232 (Nov. 13, 1986)).
77. See id. (stating that Tulloch Rule developed in response to litigation);
Burnham, supra note 1, at 1363 (stating Tulloch case's egregious facts). First, the
developer cleared the land by pushing the vegetation from the wetland area. See
id. Then, he excavated ponds and drainage ditches by using draglines and backhoes. Id. Finally, he placed the excavated soil into sealed containers on the truck
in a manner that only drippings from the buckets fell onto the ground. Id. In
another area, the developer used the excavations to drain the wetlands. Id.
78. See Civ. No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C. 1992) (containing Tulloch complaint); Burnham, supra note 1, at 1351 (explaining Tulloch facts).
79. See id. at 1362-63 (stating that Corps determined that seven hundred of
eighteen hundred acres were wetlands).
80. Id. (stating developer avoided Section 404 permit by applying strategic
and sophisticated techniques).
81. Id. (describing manner of excavation).
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the wetlands hydrology and vegetation, thereby removing the area
82
from the Corps' jurisdiction.
Environmentalists sought Section 404 action due to concern
83
that the developer's activities would adversely affect the wetlands.
As part of the Tulloch settlement, the EPA and the Corps agreed to
revise the permit requirements and the definition of "discharge of
dredged material," which laid the foundation for the 1993 Tulloch
Rule. 84 The 1993 Tulloch Rule stated:

The term discharge of dredged material means any addition of dredged material into, including any redeposit of
dredged material within, the waters of the United States.
The term includes, but is not limited to, the following... (iii) any addition, including redeposit, of dredged

material, including excavated material, into waters of the
United States which is incidental to any activity, including
mechanized landclearing, ditching, channelization, or
85
other excavation.
The 1993 Tulloch Rule essentially included incidental soil
movement associated with dredging activities in the definition of
"discharge of dredged material. '86 "Incidental fallback" is the de
minimis soil movement due to excavation, including soil that is disturbed when shoveled or the back-spill from a bucket that falls back
into the original place.

7

The 1993 Tulloch Rule contained a de minimis exception
granting a small discharge allowance, but it shifted the burden to
the developer to show that the discharge has non-destructive, nondegrading environmental effects.

88

An incidental addition, includ-

ing a redeposit of dredged material that does not or would not have
the effect of destroying or degrading United States waters, did not
82. Id. (stating Section 404 no longer applied to developer's land).
83. See Nat'7 Mining, 145 F.3d 1399, 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describing Tulloch
facts).
84. Id. (explaining Tulloch settlement).
85. See Dredged Materials, Definitions, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii) (1993)
(stating Corps definition of "discharge of dredged material"). EPA codified a parallel rule in 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(1)(iii) (1993).
86. Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,013 (Aug.
25, 1993) (codified at 33 C.F.R., pt. 323.2).
87. See Am. Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp.
267, 270 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing Clean Water Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. at
45,013).
88. See Nat'l Mining, 145 F.3d at 1403 (stating Tulloch Rule de minimis

exception).
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require a permit.8 9 Those engaged in "mechanized landclearing,
ditching, channelization, or other excavation," bore the burden of
proving that the activities did not have destructive or degrading effects. 90 The 1993 Tulloch Rule allowed the Corps to assertjurisdiction over all discharges, regardless of size, unless the Corps believed
that the activities with which they are associated had only minimal
adverse effects. 9 1
B.

Demise of the 1993 Tulloch Rule
Mining and other trade associations vigorously challenged the

Tulloch Rule. 9 2 In American Mining Congress v. United States Army

Corps of Engineers,9 3 plaintiffs contended that the Tulloch Rule was
(1) inconsistent with the CWA's intent and (2) was arbitrary, capricious and otherwise not in accordance with the law. 9 4 The district
court held that the agencies unlawfully exceeded their statutory authority in promulgating the Tulloch Rule. 95 Thus, American Mining
96
invalidated and set aside the Tulloch Rule.

In evaluating whether the Tulloch Rule was consistent with the
CWA's legislative intent, the district court applied the standard of
review established by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
National Resource Defense Council, Inc.97 The Chevron standard re98
quires courts to give effect to unambiguous Congressional intent.
89. See id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(3)(i) (1993))..
90. Id. (defining degradation as anything creating more than de minimis or
inconsequential effect).
91. SeeNat'lMining,145 F.3d 1399, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating preamble to
Tulloch Rule as indicating that Corps recognized virtual impossibility of conducting mechanized landclearing, ditching, channelization, or excavation in
United States waters without inconsequential fallback).
92. See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
93. See 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997).
94. Id. at 270. Plaintiffs had a four-count argument: (1) the Tulloch Rule was
inconsistent with the CWA's language and intent; (2) it is arbitrary, capricious, and
otherwise not in accordance with the law, violating the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA); (3) it violated plaintiffs Fifth Amendment due process rights; and (4)
the rule was promulgated in violation of the APA. Id.
95. Id. at 278 (stating district court's conclusion).
96. See id. at 271 (finding Tulloch Rule exceeds Corps' scope of statutory
authority).
97. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (requiring courts to apply two-step analysis
for agency statutory interpretation).
98. Id. First, the court must consider if Congress spoke directly to the pertinent issue. Id. If Congressional intent is clear, then the court and agency must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed Congressional intent. Id. If Congressional intent is ambiguous, then the court must defer to the administrative
agency's interpretation, provided that such interpretation is both permissible and
reasonable. Id.
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In American Mining, the district court reasoned that: (1) Congress
did not intend to regulate excavation activities; (2) though Congress did not mention the term "incidental fallback," it gave "discharge" a definite meaning; and (3) Congress ratified eighteen
years of the Corps/EPA and judicial interpretation that excluded
incidental fallback from Section 404 regulation. 99 Thus, the 1993
Tulloch Rule failed the Chevron standard of review.10 0
The district court in American Mining concluded that incidental
fallback was not an "addition of a pollutant," and excavation sites
were not specified disposal sites. 10 1 The court reasoned that Congress never intended to regulate incidental fallback. 10 2 Also, even if
the term "addition of a pollutant" included incidental fallback, the
1993 Tulloch Rule still failed because to be subjected to the Rule,
one must dispose incidental fallback at a specified disposal site. 0 3
Therefore, under the Tulloch Rule, the term "specified disposal
site" in Section 404 would have no meaning. 10 4 Thus, the district
court held that the Tulloch Rule exceeded the scope of Corps'
authority.

10 5

The Corps and the EPA appealed the American Mining decision
to the D.C. Circuit in National Mining Ass'n v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers.'0 6 National Mining affirmed that incidental
fallback did not constitute an addition of dredged material. 10 7 The
circuit court noted that "because incidental fallback represents a
net withdrawal, not addition, of material, it cannot be a discharge."10 8 The court further stated that "regardless of any legal
metamorphosis that may occur at the moment of dredging, we fail

99. See Am. Mining, 951 F. Supp. at 271-78 (D.D.C. 1997) (analyzing Tulloch
Rule under two-step Chevron test).
100. See id. at 277 (stating that agencies may not disregard specific statutory
scheme Congress provided).
101. Id. at 278 (stating district court's conclusion).
102. Id. (explaining district court's interpretation of Congressional intent).
103. Id. (stating district court's reasoning based on statutory phrase "specified
disposal site," requiring discharge placed in disposal site affirmatively selected by

Corps).
104. Id. (interpreting Section 404 of CWA language).
105. Am. Mining, 951 F. Supp. at 278 (finding Tulloch Rule exceeds Corps'
agency authority).
106. 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reviewing Tulloch Rule).
107. See id. at 1410 (stating that if CWA inadequately protects wetlands, Congress should alter definition of "addition" of pollutant).
108. Id. at 1404 (reiterating that "addition" cannot reasonably include
removal).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol15/iss1/3
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to see how there can be an addition of dredged material when
there is no addition of material." 0 9
The D.C. Circuit clarified the American Mining holding by stating that the Corps exceeded its statutory authority by asserting juris-

diction over "any redeposit," including incidental fallback. 110 The
National Mining decision held the 1993 Tulloch Rule invalid, resulting in a nationwide injunction.1 1 1
C.

Revision of Tulloch Rule

The Corps and the EPA ceased litigation over the 1993 Tulloch
Rule and proposed a new version of the Rule. 112 The proposed
rule sought to redefine "discharge of dredged material."" 3 The
proposed rule established a rebuttable presumption that mechanized landclearing, ditching, channelization activity or other mechanized excavation activity in United States waters would result in
more than incidental fallback. 14 Due to the fallback, a Section 404
permit is required. 1 15 Under the revision, those desiring to undertake such activities bear the burden of proving that any redeposits
of dredged materials into United States waters were incidental
fallback and that no regulated discharges would occur. 116 This type
of regulation would require the Corps' review even before a permit
would issue.'1 7 To demonstrate that only incidental fallback would
occur, parties proposing the wetland activity need to show that the
dredged material returned "virtually to the same spot from which it
came."' 18 Parties failing to meet this burden must apply for a Section 404 permit in order to continue with the dredging. 119
109. Id. (rejecting "legal metamorphosis" of material).
110. Id. at 1405 (stating that Corps only exceeds statutory authority by assertingjurisdiction over incidental fallback under Tulloch Rule). The Corps may legally regulate some forms of redeposit. Id.
111. See Nat'l Mining, 145 F.3d at 1410 (stating circuit court's holding).
112. Burnham, supra note 1, at 1369, 1396 (stating that agencies chose to propose new rule in lieu of appealing Nat'l Mining decision).
113. See id. at 1369 (stating proposed definition of "discharge of dredged
material").
114. Id. (describing rebuttable presumption of required permit).
115. Id. (summarizing proposed Rule's effect).
116. Id. (explaining Rule's burden of proof).
117. Burnham, supra note 1, at 1370 (stating that each potentially-regulated
activity would require some level of Corps review).
118. See id. (explaining effect of permit applicant's failure to meet burden of

proof).
119. Id. (explaining result of permit applicant's failure to meet burden of
proof).
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The Corps promulgated the final version of the Tulloch Rule
on January 17, 2001 to be effective in April 2001.120 The Corps

modified the final rule according to the comments received on the
proposed rule. 12 1 The final rule removed the burden on dredgers
to show that only incidental fallback would occur. 122 To determine
whether an activity results in a "discharge of dredged materials" in
United States waters, the Corps will consider the "use of mechanized, earth-moving equipment to conduct land clearing, ditching,
1 23
channelization, in-stream mining or other earth-moving activity."'
The only exception is if a "project-specific evidence shows that the
activity results in only incidental fallback."' 124 The Corps will evaluate the horizontal and vertical relocation of dredged material, as
well as material that is "suspended or disturbed such that it is
moved by currents and resettles beyond the place of initial removal." 25 Additionally, the Corps' evaluation shall determine the
26
volume of material redeposited.
The final rule also defines "incidental fallback," which excludes "dredged material." 127 Incidental fallback
is the redeposit of small volumes of dredged material that
is incidental to excavation activity in the waters of the
United States when such material falls back to substantially
the same place as the initial removal. Examples of incidental fallback include soil that is disturbed when dirt is
120. Dredged Materials, supra note 19, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2002) (codifying
Further Revisions to CWA Regulatory "Definition of Discharge of Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 4549 (Jan. 17, 2001) and codifying Further Revisions to CWA
Regulatory "Definition of Discharge of Dredged Material": Delay of Effective Date,
66 Fed. Reg. 10,367 (Feb. 15, 2001). See also Burhnam, supra note 1, at 1370 (explaining final version of Tulloch Rule).
121. Dredged Materials, supra note 19 , 33 C.F.R. § 323 (2002) (codifying
final rule). See also Burnham, supra note 1, at 1370 (stating incorporation of modifications to final rule).
122. Dredged Materials, supra note 19, 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(d)(2)(i) (2002)
(stating requirement for project-specific evidence showing that activity results in
incidental fallback by developer and is not intended to shift any burden in administrative or judicial proceeding under CWA). See also Burnham, supra note 1, at
1370 (stating modifications of new rule).
123. Dredged Materials, supra note 19, § 323.2(d) (describing exceptions to
general requirements).
124. Id. at § 323.2(d) (2) (i) (defining exceptions to "discharge of dredged
materials").
125. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1371 (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. 4553 (Jan. 17,
2001), which discusses elements of pollution under Section 404).
126. Id. (stating Corps' evaluation will account for amount and volume of
redeposited material).
127. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (defining dredged material); see also Burnham,
supra note 1, at 1371 (explaining "incidental fallback").
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shoveled and the back-spill that comes off a bucket when
such small volume of soil or dirt falls into substantially the
1 28
same place from which it was initially removed.
The final rule also excludes from regulation activities that result in
129
de minimis environmental effects.
Two main differences distinguish the old and new Tulloch
Rule.1 30 Unlike the old Tulloch Rule, the new Rule includes: (1) a
Section 404 exemption for activities resulting in incidental fallback;
and (2) a definition of incidental fallback.1 31 Under the new Tulloch Rule, the developer will not need a Section 404 permit if a
developer can prove, through project-specific evidence, that only a
small volume of soil falls off his equipment into substantially the
132
same place from its initial place of removal.
V.

REvISED TULLOGH RULE

IN

LIGHT OF Borden Ranch

The new Tulloch Rule's application may change the outcome
of certain cases involving "discharged material" added to a wet-

land. 33 In Borden Ranch, however, the Ninth Circuit and Supreme
Court did not apply the newly promulgated Tulloch Rule to such a
situation.13 4 Application of the Tulloch Rule would have fostered a
35
different result.
The Ninth Circuit's Borden Ranch case concerned the authority
of the Corps and EPA over a form of agricultural activity performed
in wetlands called "deep plowing/ripping." 36 The Petitioner, a
128. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) (2) (ii) (defining incidental fallback for future use in
Rule).
129. Id. at § 323.2(d) (4) (i) (stating incidental addition, including redeposit
"which does not or would not have destructive effect of United States waters, does
not require 404 permit").
130. Burnham, supranote 1, at 1372 (contrasting original and revised Tulloch
Rules).
131. Id. (citing 66 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4575 (Jan. 17, 2001)).
132. Id. at 1373 (stating that original Tulloch Rule failed to define "incidental
fallback").
133. Id. at 1375 (discussing likely challenges to new Tulloch Rule).
134. See Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d
810, 814 (9th Cir. 2001), affd 537 U.S. 99 (2002) (analyzing case under Ninth
Circuit precedent).
135. For a discussion of Borden Ranch, see infra notes 136-98 and accompanying text.
136. See Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d at 813 (concluding deep ripping can constitute discharge of pollutant under CWA). This process has two different terms to
offer connotations favorable to either party - "deep plowing" for a petitioner defending an agricultural practice and "deep ripping" for a respondent seeking to
conjure an image of wetlands destruction. See Brief for Petitioner at 1, Borden
Ranch P'ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 537 U.S. 99 (2002) (No. 01-1243) (re-
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real estate developer, purchased Borden Ranch, which contained
significant hydrological features including vernal pools, swales and
intermittent drainage. 137 The Petitioner intended to convert the
ranchland into vineyards and orchards.1 3 8 The Petitioner's plan required an agricultural technique, called "deep plowing/ripping," in
which a plow penetrates the earth. 139 Specifically, the procedure
requires a tractor to drag four-to-seven foot long metal prongs to
plow/gouge to the soil's restrictive layer.1 40 The Corps asserted
Section 404 jurisdiction over the deep ripping activity because it
"discharged dredged material" into the wetlands.1 4 1
The Petitioner challenged the Corps' jurisdiction, arguing that
deep plowing/ripping does not constitute "addition of a pollutant"
because it simply moves the soil and essentially replaces it from
where it came. 14 2 The Petitioner relied on the D.C. Circuit court's
decision in National Mining to argue that no "addition of pollutant"
existed because there was no addition of material. 143 Therefore, if
no "addition" of pollutant existed, then Sections 301 and 404 of
CWA would not govern the activity and the Corps would not have
jurisdiction.

144

The Ninth Circuit rejected Petitioner's challenge. 14 5 The
court relied on its own precedent in Rybachek v. U.S.E.P.A.," 46 holding that removing material from a streambed, sifting out the gold
and returning the material to the streambed was an "addition" of a
pollutant."47 Furthermore, the circuit court relied on the Fourth
ferring to activity as "deep plowing"). But see Brief for Respondent at 1, Borden
Ranch P'ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 537 U.S. 99 (2002) (No. 01-1243) (referring to activity as "deep ripping").
137. See Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d at 812 (defining vernal pools, swales, and intermittent drainages).
138. Id. (stating factual background).
139. Id. (explaining that conversion required mechanical penetration of soil's
restrictive layer and describing terminology connotation).
140. Id. at 819 (affirming Corps'jurisdiction over deep ripping under CWA).
141. Id. (stating Petitioner's contention that deep ripping is not "addition" of
"pollutant").
142. Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d at 812 (enumerating Petitioner's argument).
143. Id. at 819 (Gould, J. dissenting) (claiming that Nat'l Mining rule should

govern case).
144. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (explaining jurisdiction under CWA).
145. Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d at 814 (noting inconsistency between Petitioner's
argument and Ninth Circuit precedent).
146. Rybachek v. U.S.E.P.A, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1990) (asserting
that activity may require permit even if there is no addition of pollutant).
147. See id. at 1276 (creating precedent for redeposit of material as addition
of pollutant).
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Circuit's precedent in United States v. Deaton,'48 holding that once
material was excavated from the wetland, its redeposit in that same
wedand added a pollutant to where none had previously existed. 149
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit in Borden Ranch concluded that the
deep plowing/ripping constitutes an "addition" of a pollutant and,
150
therefore, is subject to Section 404 regulation.
Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit failed to use the Tulloch Rule
in its analysis. 15 1 The Ninth Circuit heard the case in July 2001,
three months after the new Tulloch Rule's effective date.1 5 2 The
circuit court declined to comment on whether the deep plowing
activity was a mechanized earth-moving activity or if it created soil
disturbances that moved the soil to substantially the same place
from where it came. 153 Under the old Tulloch Rule, the disgorgement of soil from the deep ripper would have required a Section
154
404 permit.
The new Tulloch Rule creates an ambiguous result. 155 Applying the new Tulloch Rule would have decided whether the petitioner's activity would require a Section 404 permit. 156 The Ninth
Circuit could have addressed three colorable arguments concerning the Tulloch Rule: (1) whether the Tulloch Rule survives the
APA "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review; (2) whether the
Tulloch Rule shifts the burden of proof to the defendant in violation of Fifth Amendment Due Process; and (3) whether, on the
merits, the deep plowing requires a permit under the Tulloch
Rule.

15 7

148. 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining 4th Circuit's theory on "addition" of pollutants).
149. See id. (expounding Ninth Circuit theory on transformation of nonpollutant to statutory pollutant).
150. Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d at 819 (stating 4th Circuit court's conclusion).
151. See id. at 810 (analyzing case under Ninth Circuit precedent).
152. Id. (reviewing case on July 9, 2001); see also Further Revisions to the
Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of Dredged Material," 66
Fed. Reg. 4574 (Jan. 17, 2001) (codified at 33 C.F.R. 323.2 (2002)) (stating effective date to be April 2001).
153. Dredged Materials, supra note 19, 33 C.F.R. § 323.3 (d) (2002) (explaining when Section 404 permit is not required).
154. Dredging Materials, 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(d) (1993) (stating that "discharge
of dredged material" included any discharge and redeposit, including incidental
fallback).
155. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1375 (discussing potential challenges to
new Tulloch Rule).
156. Dredged Materials, supra note 19, 33 C.F.R. § 323.3 (2002) (defining
"discharge of dredged material", which serves as Section 404 jurisdictional hook).
157. See infra notes 158-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ninth
Circuit arguments; see also Burnham, supra note 1, at 1373-95 (analyzing potential
challenges to current Tulloch Rule).
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Whether the Tulloch Rule is an Arbitrary and Capricious
Agency Action

Courts review substantive aspects of agency action, including
rulemaking, under the Administrative Procedure Act standard, evaluating whether an action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 158 Under this
standard, if the agency considers relevant factors and articulates a
rational relationship between the facts and agency action, then
courts will uphold the agency action.1 59
The Tulloch Rule requires that all activities involving mechanized earth-moving equipment in United States waters require
Corps' review to determine whether such activities result in incidental fallback, thereby, falling out of Corps' jurisdiction.160 In making
this determination, the Corps considers (1) whether the activity
substantially, horizontally or vertically relocates dredged material;
(2) whether the activity results in the release of sequestered pollutants other than incidental fallback; and (3) whether the volume
released is only small volume.1 61 Neither the EPA nor the Corps
has established quantifiable standards for considering relevant factors. 162 Additionally, the agencies have failed to define "substantial

relocation" or "small volume" in the regulation. 163
The Corps and the EPA admit that the Rule grants the Corps
"substantial flexibility" to consider types of activities proposed and
determine on a case-by-case basis whether an activity requires regu158. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2000) (listing conditions under which reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and
conclusions).
159. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1386. Agency action is presumed valid,
and courts must determine the rational relation between the factors and agency
action. Id. An agency action is considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency
has (1) relied on factors that Congress has not intended it to consider, (2) entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, (3) offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before [it], or (4) is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise. See id. (quoting N.R.D.C. v. U.S.E.P.A., 790 F.2d 289, 297-98 (3d Cir.
1986)).
160. Dredged Materials, supra note 19, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(i) (2002)
(stating that Corps and EPA will regard mechanized earth-moving activity as discharge unless project-specific evidence proves otherwise). See also Burnham, supra
note 1, at 1386 (explaining Tulloch Rule's review requirement).
161. See Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of
"Discharge of Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4553 (Jan. 17, 2001) (codified
at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323) (enumerating factors to determine regulated discharge); see
also Burnham, supra note 1, at 1387 (same).
162. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1386 (stating that Corps' failure to establish standard questions standard's validity).
163. See id. at 1387 (stating regulatory ambiguity in relevant factors).
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lation. 164 The agencies assert that the fact-specific nature of the
activity renders bright line standards inappropriate, and instead endorses a totality of factors test.165 Additionally, in 2000, the District
of Columbia district court determined that the Corps may determine whether redeposit constitutes incidental fallback on a case-bycase basis. 166 Thus, because courts appear highly deferential to
agency policy, they may not render the Tulloch Rule arbitrary and
67

capricious.1

Nevertheless, the Borden Ranch Petitioner's argument that the
Corps has "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem" in promulgating the Tulloch Rule is strong. 168 The court
failed to consider that, although the Corps itself is the main
dredger of United States waters, it is itself exempt from the regulation under the Tulloch Rule.' 69 For its own activities, the Corps
undertakes an unofficial review process.' 70 A brighter line approach would create transparency in the permit issuance process to
17 1
private individuals, as well as the Corps.

164. See Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of
"Discharge of Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4566 (Jan. 17, 2001) (codified
at 33 C.F.R. § 323.3 (2002)) (incorporating relevant factors from Nat'lMining); see
also Burnham, supra note 1, at 1386-87 (explaining breadth of Corps' activity
review).
165. See Burnham supra note 1, at 1388 (stating that quantifiable standards
are not technically feasible).
166. See Am. Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 120 F.
Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2000) (supporting case-by-case agency evaluation).
167. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1386 (stating that since agency action is
presumptively valid, courts would apply deferential standard of review and uphold
Tulloch Rule).
168. See N.R.D.C. v. U.S.E.P.A., 790 F.2d 289, 297-98 (3d Cir. 1986) (enumerating factors considered under arbitrary and capricious standard).
169. See Am. Mining, 951 F. Supp. at 270 n.3 (D.D.C. 1997) (explaining that
1993 Tulloch Rule language exempted Corps' navigational dredging under 33
C.F.R. § 323.2(d) (ii) (1993)); Permits for Structures or Work in or Affecting Navigable Waters of the United States, Activities Requiring Permits, 33 C.F.R
§ 322.3(d) (2002) (stating that federal agency action is subject to separate
regulations).
170. Interview with Barry Gale, General Counsel, United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, Philadelphia District, Philadelphia, PA (Mar. 20, 2003) (stating that for its
own activities, Corps must make an environmental assessment, environmental impact statement, follow 404(b) (1) Guidelines, and consider same factors as it does
for private permits).
171. See Am. Mining, 951 F. Supp. at 270 n.3. The district court stated that
because the Corps directly or indirectly conducts navigational dredging, the 1993
Tulloch Rule exception applied primarily to it. See id. The new Tulloch Rule contains similar language, providing a navigational dredging exception that applies
primarily to the Corps. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) (4) (iii) (2002) (indicating that some
discharge does not require permits).
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Burden Shifting as Due Process Violation

The Tulloch Rule arguably shifts the burden of showing that
the regulated party is not subject to the federal government's jurisdiction, prior to project commencement. 172 The regulated party
may claim: (1) the Tulloch Rule assumes that the use of mechanized equipment in United States waters results in discharge of
dredged material unless project-specific evidence shows that the activity only results in incidental fallback and (2) the Rule requires
persons undertaking earth-moving activities to demonstrate that
the activity will destroy or degrade United States waters. 173 The
Tulloch Rule expressly states that it does not shift any burden in
any administrative or judicial proceedings under the CWA. 174 The
Tulloch Rule, however, creates de facto requirements that shift the
175
burden of proof to the regulated community.
C.

On the Merits

On the merits, the Petitioner could have argued that deep
plowing "neither substantially disturbs the root system nor involves
mechanized pushing, dragging, or other similar activities that redeposit excavated soil material" or "destroys or degrades" the wetlands
by producing project-specific evidence that the fallback was incidental. 176 Accordingly, the soil would be categorized as incidental
177
fallback, and it would not require a Section 404 permit.
The Respondents, however, would argue that the regulation
specifically addresses deep plowing since it requires mechanized
equipment to excavate the land, subsequently creating the effect of
destroying or degrading the wetlands.17 8 The Corps would evaluate
the substantial horizontal deposits of soil created by the process. 179
172. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1392-94 (discussing potential due process

violation).
173. Id. (discussing burden-shifting claims).
174. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) (2) (i) (stating that requirement to present projectspecific evidence indicating that activity results in incidental fallback is not intended to shift burden).
175. Burnham, supra note 1, at 1392 (positing plaintiffs potential claim
against Tulloch Rule).
176. Id. at § 323.2(d) (2) (i) (2002) (explaining regulated community's burden).
177. Id. at § 323.2(d) (3) (iii) (stating that "discharge of dredged material"
does not include "incidental fallback").
178. Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing deep ripping
as process whereby tractors drag four to seven foot metal prongs through soil to
gouge its restrictive layer).
179. See Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of
"Discharge of Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4553 (Jan. 17, 2001) (codified
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In dispositively accepting or rejecting these arguments, the
Ninth Circuit would have clarified the new Tulloch Rule's application and limitations.1 8 0 Alternatively, it could have remanded the
case to the EPA to consider the Tulloch Rule. 18' In declining to
address the Rule, the Ninth Circuit added to the precedential mo18 2
rass regarding the "addition/incidental fallback" issue.
VI.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TULLOCH RULE AFTER
BORDEN RANCH

The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit decision in a
per curiam decision on December 16, 2002.183 The Court provided
no guidance on the issues of the Borden Ranch case or the new Tulloch Rule. 1 84 The Supreme Court's reticence seems appropriate
because lower courts did not argue the Tulloch Rule. 8 5 The decision left open the "addition/incidental fallback" issue and failed to
8 6

provide guidance.1

The Supreme Court likely was hesitant to decide the Borden
Ranch case and evaluate the Tulloch Rule for a number of reasons. 18 7 First, federal jurisdiction over wetlands is a highly controversial issue. 1 88 In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) ,189 the Court effectively limin 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.2) (stating that Corps will evaluate vertical and horizontal relocation of material).
180. Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d at 820 (demonstrating Ninth Circuit's ability to
analyze different theories on "addition of pollutant," thereby clarifying Ninth Circuit's position).
181. See e.g., Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. E.P.A., 255 F.3d 855 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (remanding case to EPA for further proceedings consistent with circuit
court's opinion).
182. For a discussion of precedent, see supra notes 146-49 and accompanying
text.
183. See Borden Ranch, 537 U.S. at 100 (2002) (affirming Ninth Circuit's
decision).
184. Id. (stating that one justice recused himself from case).
185. See JACK FRIEDENTHAL, ET. AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: HORNBOOK SERIES,
§ 14.7 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that full resjudicata effect will be given to judgments
based on invalid judicial rules so long as there was fair opportunity to raise issue in
first proceeding or appeal).
186. See Borden Ranch, 537 U.S. at 100 (2002) (affirming Ninth Circuit's decision without analysis).
187. For a discussion, see infra note 188-95 and accompanying text.
188. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1349 (explaining controversial nature of
United States wetlands policy).
189. 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding that federal government had no jurisdiction over migratory bird habitat because non-navigable, isolated, intrastate waters
under CWA).
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ited the Corps' jurisdiction over United States wetlands. 190 The
Court may not have wanted to limit further the Corps' jurisdiction
over wetlands activity by reversing the Ninth Circuit's Borden Ranch
decision and parsing the Tulloch Rule. 19 1 Second, the Bush Administration's policy is to assure that wetlands suffer "no net
loss. ' 192 The Court may opt to keep the Corps' jurisdiction broad
19 3
to effectuate this goal.
Finally, the Borden Ranch fact pattern may not have been appropriate for the Supreme Court to overturn the Ninth Circuit's carefully crafted decision due to the rancher's knowing violation of the
CWA permit regulations. 194 In Borden Ranch, the rancher knowingly violated permit regulations despite having conferred and ne195
gotiated with the Corps.
How the courts will apply the Tulloch Rule in the future remains to be seen.' 9 6 Until a party challenges the rule, it remains
good law.1 9 7 The Borden Ranch decisions and the absence of the
courts' analyses under the Tulloch Rule, however, exemplify how
good law may be rendered useless if the courts refuse to apply the
law. 198
Anjali Kharod
190. See id. at 171 (rejecting Corps' jurisdiction over non-navigable, isolated,
intrastate waters).
191. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (limiting Corps' jurisdiction over discharge
of dredged material). The revised Tulloch Rule excludes incidental fallback from
the definition of "discharge of dredged material," thereby excluding Corps jurisdiction. Dredged Materials, supra note 19, 33 C.F.R. § 323.3 (2002).
192. U.S.E.P.A, Administration to Reaffirm Commitment to No Net Loss of Wetlands
and Address Approachfor ProtectingIsolated Waters in Light of Supreme Court Ruling on
JurisdictionalIssues, available at http://www.epa.gov/epahome/headline2_011003.
htm (Jan. 10, 2003) (renewing federal government's commitment to protect
United States wetlands).
193. Id. (acknowledging SWANCCs effective limitation on federal authority
over wetlands).
194. Id.; see also SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 165 (2001). The Court ruled favorably for plaintiffs that followed CWA permit procedures, obtained special permit
from the state, and secured water quality certification. See id.
195. See Borden Ranch P'ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, CIV. S-97-0858
GEB JFM, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21389 at Section I.A. (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1999)
(stating plaintiffs awareness that most or all activities required CWA permit).
Plaintiff had familiarity with Corps and had applied for permits under CWA § 404.
Id. The plaintiff also contacted Corps to inquire whether he needed to obtain a
Section 404 permit for the Borden Ranch land conversion. Id.
196. See Burnham, supra note 1, at 1372-96 (analyzing potential outcomes of
Tulloch Rule judicial review).
197. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000) (establishing criteria by which reviewing court
may declare agency action invalid); see also Burnham, supra note 1, at 1386 (stating
that agency action is presumptively valid).
198. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
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